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FBI's Theory On Anthrax Is Doubted - Attacks Not Likely Work Of One Person, Experts Say
Anthrax - Update (German)
FBI Press Release regarding a linguistic and behavioral profile of the person/s responsible for the U.S. anthrax attacks
FBI's Theory On Anthrax Is Doubted - Attacks Not Likely Work Of One Person, Experts Say
Guy Gugliotta and Gary Matsumoto, Washington Post Staff Writers, Monday, October 28, 2002, Page A01. - A significant number of scientists and biological warfare experts are
expressing skepticism about the FBI's view that a single disgruntled
American scientist prepared the spores and mailed the deadly anthrax
letters that killed five people last year. These sources say that making a weaponized aerosol of such sophistication and virulence would require scientific knowledge, technical competence,
access to expensive equipment and safety know-how that are probably beyond
the capabilities of a lone individual. As a result, a consensus has emerged in recent months among experts familiar with the technology needed to turn anthrax spores into the deadly
aerosol that was sent to Sens. Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick J.
Leahy (D-Vt.) that some of the fundamental assumptions driving the FBI's
investigation may be flawed. "In my opinion, there are maybe four or five people in the whole country who might be able to make this stuff, and I'm one of them," said Richard O.
Spertzel, chief biological inspector for the U.N. Special Commission from
1994 to 1998. "And even with a good lab and staff to help run it, it might
take me a year to come up with a product as good." Instead, suggested Spertzel and more than a dozen experts interviewed by The Washington Post in recent weeks, investigators might want to reexamine the possibility of state-sponsored terrorism, or try to determine whether
weaponized spores may have been stolen by the attacker from an existing,
but secret, biodefense program or perhaps given to the attacker by an
accomplice.
The Defense Department and FBI refused repeated requests from The Post to
discuss recent developments in the anthrax investigation. But in some
important respects, the official version of events -- developed in part
during the early, frantic days of the probe -- is at odds with the
available evidence, the experts say. A profile of the attacker issued by the FBI last November (see below) described an angry, "lone individual" with "some" science background who could weaponize the anthrax spores in a basement laboratory for as little as $2,500. The
FBI acknowledged that the sender may not have been a native English speaker
but emphasized that there was no "direct or clear" link between the attacks
and foreign terrorism. More recently, investigators appear to have abandoned the idea of an
amateur attacker, but they continue to focus on a lone, domestic scientist,
probably an insider. Attention has centered on medical doctor and
virologist Steven J. Hatfill, a former U.S. Army scientist identified by
the Justice Department as a "person of interest" in the investigation.
Hatfill vigorously denies any involvement.
Scientists suggested that the loner theory appeared flawed even in the
opening days of the investigation. The profile was issued three weeks after
U.S. Army scientists had examined the Daschle spores and found them to be
1.5 to 3 microns in size and processed to a grade of 1 trillion spores per
gram -- 50 times finer than anything produced by the now-defunct U.S.
bioweapons program and 10 times finer than the finest known grade of Soviet
anthrax spores. A micron is a millionth of a meter. "Just collecting this stuff is a trick," said Steven A. Lancos, executive vice president of Niro Inc., one of the leading manufacturers of spray
dryers, viewed by several sources as the likeliest tool needed to weaponize
the anthrax bacteria. "Even on a small scale, you still need containment.
If you're going to do it right, it could cost millions of dollars."
Possible Foreign Source
Also early in the case, U.S. authorities dismissed the possibility that
Iraq could have sponsored the attacks because investigators determined that
the spores had been coated with silica to make them disperse quickly,
rather than the mineral bentonite, regarded by the U.S. Army Medical
Research and Materiel Command as Iraq's additive of choice. However, Iraq's alleged preference for bentonite appears to be based on a single sample of a common pesticide collected by U.N. authorities from Iraq's Al Hakam biological weapons facility in the mid-1990s. By contrast,
the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency warned in declassified documents as
early as 1989 that Iraq was acquiring silica to use as a chemical weapons
additive. In 1998, Iraq reported to the United Nations that it had conducted an
artillery test of a live biological agent that used silica as a dispersant.
And U.N. and U.S. intelligence documents reviewed by The Post show that
Iraq had bought all the essential equipment and ingredients needed to
weaponize anthrax bacteria with silica to a grade consistent with the
Daschle and Leahy letters. Daschle, Leahy and a few other senators and representatives have received periodic FBI briefings on the investigation, and Leahy said last week that
the agency "has not foreclosed the possibility of a foreign source of this
attack." However, the FBI's continued focus on Hatfill shows the agency's
preoccupation with a domestic loner. Bush administration officials have acknowledged that the anthrax attacks were an important motivator in the U.S. decision to confront Iraq, and
several senior administration officials say today that they still strongly
suspect a foreign source -- perhaps Iraq -- even though no one has publicly
said so. That Iraq had the wherewithal to make the anthrax letters does not mean it
is the guilty party. Still, the FBI's early dismissal of the possibility
may have prematurely closed a legitimate line of inquiry. "Iraq almost certainly had their anthrax spores in a powdered form," Spertzel said. "They had used silica gel to aid in dispersibility of
[wheat] smut spores, and also indicated they were looking at it as a
carrier for aflatoxin," a carcinogen.
Since the attacks one year ago, scientists have been able to identify the
anthrax bacteria used in the Daschle and Leahy letters as the "Ames
strain," a virulent anthrax used in U.S. biodefense programs. Analysts are examining lab variants of the Ames strain to find possible sources for the original spores, but scientists and biowarfare experts say the additive used to disperse the spores may be as instructive as the
spores themselves. Even the sparse evidence made public by the investigation -- the uniformly
tiny particle size and the trillion-spore-per-gram concentration -- has
been enough to show many researchers that whoever weaponized the spores was
operating at the outer limits of known aerosol technology. The mailer was
brutally efficient in making a very special product for a very special
mission. The anthrax mailer needed a powder that could negotiate the U.S. postal
system without absorbing so much moisture that it would cake up. At the end
of the trip, the coated spores had to be light and supple enough to fly
into the air with no delivery system beyond the rip of a letter opener
through an envelope. Finally, the spores had to be small enough for potential victims to inhale
them deep into their lungs so that only a tiny number of spores would be
needed to kill -- far fewer than the dosages anticipated by the U.S.
government for the cruder aerosols of the past. The answer was silica -- the same silicon dioxide that comprises substances ranging from beach sand to window glass. The attacker needed a special kind of silica, however, because the aerosol that delivered the spores was as
sophisticated as any on the market. "You need to get a drug into the bloodstream as an alternative to injecting it," said pharmaceutical scientist Richard Dalby of the University of
Maryland's Aerosol Lab. "You need the drug to get much deeper into the
lung, where the membranes are thinner, and to do that, you need smaller
particles." The pharmaceutical industry is the leader in this technology, Dalby added,
but "there's only been an interest in generating tiny particles for that
purpose for about the last 10 years." Several sources agreed that the most likely way to build the coated spores would be to use the fine glass particles, known generically as "fumed
silica" or "solid smoke," and mix them with the spores in a spray dryer. "I
know of no other technique that might give you that finished product,"
Spertzel said.
According to William C. Patrick III, the former chief of product
development for the U.S. Army's now-defunct bioweapons program, U.S.
government scientists made biological agents using spray dryers, but did
not spray dry anthrax. Fumed silica grains are between 0.012 and 0.300 of a micron in size, and
will readily adhere to the surface of any larger particle, such as an
anthrax spore. Coated particles will easily disperse, because the grains
act as tiny "ball bearings," enabling the larger bits to skid past one
another. Under an electron microscope, fumed silica would look like cotton balls
strung together into strands that branch out in every direction. Their
extremely small size gives them an aerodynamic quality, and their high
surface area allows them to readily trap moisture, acting as a natural
dessicant. "If you packaged this stuff in a container, it would float out, and it's
highly dispersible and messy to deal with," said C. Jeffrey Brinker, a
University of New Mexico chemical engineer and a senior scientist at the
Sandia National Laboratories. Moreover, Brinker added, simply by shaking the particles in a jar, they acquire an electric charge, which causes them to repel one another and not
clump together. A few passes through a mail-sorting machine would create
the same effect. The particles would float, but they would remain separated. "This concept of using something that would serve as a dessicant and a carrier at the same time is new," said Harvard University chemical engineer David Edwards. "It's a diabolically brilliant idea." Fumed silica has myriad uses, mostly as a thickening agent in products including ceramics, house paint, toothpaste and cosmetics. It is not widely known as an aerosol additive. "If you're going to put it into the lung, there has to be a mechanism to clear it, otherwise you just fill up somebody's lung with silica after repeated dosings," said Dalby, of the Aerosol Lab. The anthrax mailer, he
noted, obviously wasn't worried about giving his victims silicosis. Some fumed silicas are extremely difficult to make, but at least two -- Aerosil and Cab-O-Sil -- are readily available and sold commercially in bulk. Either product, in theory, could be used to coat anthrax spores.
Aerosil is based in Germany and Cab-O-Sil, in Boston. Both firms have offices around the world. Ken Alibek, a former deputy director of the Soviet bioweapons program now
running an Alexandria biotechnology firm, said the Soviets used Aerosil in
agent powders, and a classified Defense Department memo in 1991 said Iraq
had "imported approximately 100 MT [metric tons] of Aerosil during the last
8-9 years." Spertzel said the United Nations reported in the 1990s that
Iraq had 10 metric tons of Cab-O-Sil, probably destined for its chemical
weapons program.
The United Nations also documented the presence of three Niro Inc. spray
dryers in Iraq in the 1990s. Spertzel said two were destroyed, and the
third was scoured and sterilized before inspectors could examine it. In spray drying, a technician mixes fumed silica and spores with water, then sprays the mist through a nozzle directly into a stream of superheated air shooting from a second nozzle into an enclosed chamber. The water
evaporates instantly, leaving spores and additive floating in space. "Surface tension will pull those little [silica] particles together onto the big one," said California Institute of Technology chemical engineer Richard Flagan. "You will end up with some degree of coating." Whoever made such an aerosol would "need some experience" with aerosols and "would have to have a lot of anthrax, so you could practice," Edwards said. "You'd have to do a lot of trial and error to get the particles you wanted." It would also help to have an electron microscope to examine the results. This would mean at least several hundred thousand dollars worth of equipment, several experts said. Niro's cheapest spray dryer sells for about $50,000. Electron microscopes cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.
In all, said Niro's Lancos, "you would need [a] chemist who is familiar
with colloidal [fumed] silica, and a material science person to put it all
together, and then some mechanical engineers to make this work . . .
probably some containment people, if you don't want to kill anybody. You
need half a dozen, I think, really smart people." One way to assemble such a team would be with "the knowing complicity of the government of the state in which it [the agent] is made," Spertzel
said. Another way to acquire the agent, several sources acknowledged, would be to steal it from a biodefense program that uses live biological agents for research or training purposes. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 bans offensive biowarfare research, but it clearly allows signatory nations to undertake biodefense programs using small quantities of live agents. The Daschle and Leahy letters each contained 1.5 grams of anthrax powder or less, well within the boundaries of what researchers describe as "laboratory quantities" of agent. It is impossible to account publicly for all the anthrax powder that may exist in the United States, because most of
the defense projects that use it are classified. The Post asked the Defense Department whether the U.S. armed forces have made any anthrax powder comparable to that which was mailed to the Senate.
The department declined to comment, citing the ongoing anthrax investigation. There is, however, no public evidence that the Army has used spray-dried agents in recent biodefense projects, choosing instead to test small amounts of irradiated -- and therefore nonlethal -- anthrax bacteria that
had been dried with older technologies.
In a written response to questions about the U.S. interpretation of the
weapons convention, the Defense Department said its personnel may use live
biological agents in a number of research settings: for vaccines and
treatment; protective clothing and containment; alarms and detection; and
decontamination. The department "does not set quantitative thresholds for the agents or
toxins in its possession," but "these quantities are generally small," the
response said. "DOD continues to evaluate its procedures to ensure
dangerous materials are safely stored and properly disposed of when no
longer required."
Anthrax - Update (German)
Die Anthrax-Sporen, die im Herbst 2001 an Politiker und Journalisten geschickt worden und fünf Personen getötet worden waren, sind erst in den letzten beiden Jahren produziert worden. Die ursprünglich für möglich gehaltene These, dass der Täter die Anthrax-Sporen aus Labor-Beständen des Militärs oder des privaten Sektors gestohlen oder anderweitig beschafft haben könnte, kann damit beiseite geschoben werden. Beim Täter müsse es sich um jemanden handeln, der Zugang zu mikrobiologischen Laboratorien hat, in denen moderne Anlagen verfügbar sind. Das FBI sucht einen männlichen Einzelgänger mit umfangreichen wissenschaftlichen Kenntnissen, der einen Groll gegen die Gesellschaft oder gegen den Staat hegt, mit Kenntnissen, Fähigkeiten, Ausbildung und Erfahrung in dieser Richtung.
FBI Press Release regarding a linguistic and behavioral profile of the person/s responsible for the U.S. anthrax attacks
The FBI is releasing linguistic and behavioral assessments of the person responsible for mailing anthrax-laden letters on September 18 and October 9, 2001. We ask the American public to study these assessments and reflect on whether someone of their acquaintance might fit the profile. The safety of the American people is at stake. If you have credible information that might help identify this person, please contact 001-800-CRIMETV (274-6388) or use IFCCFBI.GOV (or, if U.S. resident, call your local FBI Field Office). Source: http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/anthrax/amerithrax.htm (now outdated).
EVIDENCE DESCRIPTION
Letter 1
One page, hand-printed letter
Transmittal envelope, also similarly hand printed
Addressed to "NBC TV – Tom Brokaw" – No return address
Postmarked Trenton, NJ 09/18/2001 (Tues.)
Letter 2
One page, hand-printed letter
Transmittal envelope, also similarly hand printed
Addressed to "NY Post" – No return address
Postmarked Trenton, NJ 09/18/2001 (Tues.)
Letter 3
One page, hand-printed letter
Transmittal envelope, also similarly hand printed
Addressed to "Senator Daschle – 509 Hart Senate Office Building"
Return address – "4th Grade, Greendale School, Franklin Park, NJ"
Return address zip code – "08852"
Postmarked Trenton, NJ 10/09/2001 (Tues.)
It is highly probable, bordering on certainty, that all three letters were authored by the same person. Letters 1 and 2 are identical copies. Letter 3, however, contains a somewhat different message than the other letters. The Anthrax utilized in Letter 3 was much more refined, more potent, and more easily disbursed than letters 1 and 2.
In the past, the public has helped the FBI solve high profile investigations that involved writings by coming forward to identify the author, either by how he wrote or by what he wrote. We are asking for the public's help here again in the same way.
While the text in these letters is limited, there are certain distinctive characteristics in the author's writing style. These same characteristics may be evident in other letters, greeting cards, or envelopes this person has written. We hope someone has received correspondence from this person and will recognize some of these characteristics.
The characteristics include:
1. The author uses dashes ("-") in the writing of the date "09-11-01." Many people use the slash ("/") to separate the day/month/year.
2. In writing the number one, the author chooses to use a formalized, more detailed version. He writes it as "1" instead of the simple vertical line.
3. The author uses the words "can not," when many people prefer to spell it as one word, "cannot."
4. The author writes in all upper case block-style letters. However, the first letter of the first word of each sentence is written in slightly larger upper case lettering. Also, the first letter of all proper nouns (like names) is slightly larger. This is apparently the author's way of indicating a word should be capitalized in upper case lettering. For whatever reason, he may not be comfortable or practiced in writing in lower case lettering.
5. The names and address on each envelope are noticeably tilted on a downward slant from left to right. This may be a characteristic seen on other envelopes he has sent.
6. The envelopes are of the pre-stamped variety, the stamps denoting 34 cents, which are normally available directly from the post office. They are not the traditional business size envelopes, but the smaller size measuring approximately 6 1/4" x 3 ½".
BEHAVIORAL ASSESSMENT
Based on the selection of Anthrax as the "weapon" of choice by this individual, the offender:
• is likely an adult male.
• if employed, is likely to be in a position requiring little contact with the public, or other employees. He may work in a laboratory. He is apparently comfortable working with an extremely hazardous material. He probably has a scientific background to some extent, or at least a strong interest in science.
• has likely taken appropriate protective steps to ensure his own safety, which may include the use of an Anthrax vaccination or antibiotics.
• has access to a source of Anthrax and possesses knowledge and expertise to refine it.
• possesses or has access to some laboratory equipment; i.e., microscope, glassware, centrifuge, etc.
• has exhibited an organized, rational thought process in furtherance of his criminal behavior.
• has a familiarity, direct or indirect, with the Trenton, NJ, metropolitan area; however, this does not necessarily mean he currently lives in the Trenton, NJ, area.. He is comfortable traveling in and around this locale.
• did not select victims randomly. He made an effort to identify the correct address, including zip code, of each victim and used sufficient postage to ensure proper delivery of the letters. The offender deliberately "selected" NBC News, the New York Post, and the office of Senator Tom Daschle as the targeted victims (and possibly AMI in Florida). These targets are probably very important to the offender. They may have been the focus of previous expressions of contempt which may have been communicated to others, or observed by others.
• is a non-confrontational person, at least in his public life. He lacks the personal skills necessary to confront others. He chooses to confront his problems "long distance" and not face-to-face. He may hold grudges for a long time, vowing that he will get even with "them" one day. There are probably other, earlier examples of this type of behavior. While these earlier incidents were not actual Anthrax mailings, he may have chosen to anonymously harass other individuals or entities that he perceived as having wronged him. He may also have chosen to utilize the mail on those occasions.
• prefers being by himself more often than not. If he is involved in a personal relationship it will likely be of a self serving nature.
Pre-Offense Behavior
• Following the events of September 11, 2001, this person may have become mission oriented in his desire to undertake these Anthrax mailings. He may have become more secretive and exhibited an unusual pattern of activity. Additionally, he may have displayed a passive disinterest in the events which otherwise captivated the Nation. He also may have started taking antibiotics unexpectedly.
Post-Offense Behavior
• He may have exhibited significant behavioral changes at various critical periods of time throughout the course of the Anthrax mailings and related media coverage. These may include the following;
1. Altered physical appearance.
2. Pronounced anxiety.
3. Atypical media interest.
4. Noticeable mood swings.
5. More withdrawn.
6. Unusual level of preoccupation.
7. Unusual absenteeism.
8. Altered sleeping and/or eating habits.
These post-offense behaviors would have been most noticeable during critical times, including but not limited to: the mailing of the letters (09/18/01 and 10/09/01), the death of first Anthrax victim, media reports of each anthrax incident, and especially the deaths and illnesses of non-targeted victims.
(November 9, 2001)
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